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1. Introduction
Children and adults have been reported to differ in their interpretation of scopally ambiguous sen-
tences such as Every horse didn’t jump over the fence (Musolino 1998; Gualmini 2004; Gualmini et al.
2008; Musolino & Lidz 2006; see also Lidz & Musolino 2002; Musolino et al. 2000; Musolino & Lidz
2006; Kra¨mer 2000; Moscati & Crain 2014; Moscati et al. 2016, among many others). A recent approach
in the literature treats this difference as fully pragmatic in nature. In particular, Gualmini et al. (2008)
have proposed an explanation based on what they call the Question-Answer Requirement (QAR), which
locates the source of the difference in the understood Question Under Discussion (QUD) in the context.
The main idea behind the QAR is that any sentence is to be understood as an answer to a QUD. As a
consequence, in the case of scopally ambiguous sentences, a given reading of the sentence is accessible
(to adults and children) only if it constitutes a possible answer to the contextual QUD. Children and
adults are then claimed to differ only in how they handle and accommodate QUDs. In particular, if the
reading that would answer the salient QUD is false in the context, adults, but not children, are able to
accommodate a new QUD in order to access the true interpretation of the ambiguous sentence.
Given that it locates the difference only in the way QUDs are managed, the QAR approach predicts
that if the effects of the QUD are controlled for, children and adults should perform alike. In this study,
we indirectly probed the role of the QUD in scope ambiguity resolution by moving to a linguistic context
where there is no sentence that constitutes an answer to the relevant QUD. To do so, we tested children’s
and adults’ comprehension of scopally ambiguous questions, rather than declaratives. The main finding
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of our experiment is that 4–6-year-old children and adults display the same rates of access to the inverse
scope readings of such questions. This finding is consistent with a general assumption underlying the
QAR approach, which is that there is no grammatical difference in children’s and adults’ ability to access
inverse scope readings. Indeed, once the QUD factor is controlled for, the two groups perform alike.
We further discuss the compatibility of our results with two alternative hypotheses concerning the
QAR and the interpretation of questions. The first possibility is that the QUD is simply not a factor
that affects the interpretation of questions. This would explain why we found no difference between
children and adults. In this scenario, the QAR approach to scope interpretation should not be extended
to questions. The second possibility is that the QAR approach should be formulated in such a way
that it can be extended to explain performance on questions, in particular invoking a notion of super-
question and sub-question (Roberts, 1996). In this latter scenario, the lack of a difference between
children and adults would be due to the fact that our experimental contexts made salient a super-question
that facilitated inverse scope interpretations. We end by discussing a possible formulation of such an
extended QAR approach to questions, and sketch a follow-up experiment that could distinguish between
the two scenarios just mentioned.
2. Background
2.1. Children and scope ambiguity resolution
2.1.1. Grammatical account and pragmatic felicity
Sentences that contain more than one scope-bearing element, such as negation, quantifiers, or modal
verbs, are often ambiguous. For example, a sentence like (1) has two possible interpretations: a surface
scope reading on which the universal quantifier every takes scope over the negation, which we could
paraphrase as in (1-a), and an inverse scope reading on which the negation takes scope over every,
paraphrasable as in (1-b).
(1) Every horse didn’t jump over the fence.
a. Every horse is such that it didn’t jump over the fence Surface Scope reading
b. Not every horse jumped over the fence Inverse Scope reading
In one of the earliest studies on scope ambiguity resolution in children, Musolino (1998) presented
sentences like (1) to preschoolers (aged 4–6 years) and adults in a Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain &
Thornton, 1998). Each sentence was provided as a description of a short story that would make it true
on its inverse scope interpretation and false on its surface scope reading (e.g., only two out of the three
horses jumped over the fence). Musolino found that children would consistently reject (1) as false in
such contexts, providing evidence that they were accessing only the surface scope interpretation of the
sentence. Adults, on the other hand, had no problem accessing the inverse scope reading of the sentence
and accepted it as true in the vast majority of cases. Based on these results, one could hypothesize that
the difference between adults and children is of a grammatical nature. That is, at this particular stage of
development, children are able to generate surface scope interpretations of scopally ambiguous sentences
but not inverse scope interpretations.
A number of studies have since challenged this hypothesis (Gualmini 2004; Musolino & Lidz 2006;
Kra¨mer 2000, among others), at least on its most radical version, which would claim that children are un-
able to access inverse scope readings altogether. In particular, Gualmini (2004) has noted that children’s
rejection rates for inverse scope readings vary considerably across experimental items. Researchers have
since explored the possibility that the story contexts in which the sentences were presented had an effect
on their interpretation. In an experiment similar to the one presented in Musolino (1998), Gualmini
(2004) tested 4- and 5-year-old children’s comprehension of sentences containing negation and the exis-
tential quantifier some, such as (2), which could be interpreted roughly as in (2-a) or (2-b).
(2) The troll didn’t deliver some pizzas.
a. The troll didn’t deliver any pizzas. Surface Scope reading
b. Some pizzas were not delivered by the troll. Inverse Scope reading
2
The sentence in (2) was presented as the description of a story in which a troll has to deliver four pizzas,
but he ends up losing two of them, and so only manages to deliver two out of the four pizzas. The
sentence is therefore false on its surface scope interpretation (2-a) but true on the inverse scope reading
(2-b). Contrary to the findings in Musolino (1998), children actually accessed the inverse scope reading
of (2) and similar sentences 90% of the time. Such a finding poses a challenge to the idea that children’s
previous failure to access inverse scope readings were due to an inability to generate such readings
altogether.
Based on these results, Gualmini (2004) proposes an alternative pragmatic explanation of why chil-
dren and adults differ in their interpretation of scopally ambiguous sentences. Gualmini observes that
the sentences that had previously been investigated involved negation, and connects the scope findings
to well-known observations about felicity conditions on the use of negation. In particular, it has been
observed that negative sentences are normally used to point out a discrepancy between the expected
outcome of a situation and its actual outcome (Wason, 1965; De Villiers & Flusberg, 1975). In other
words, the context has to supply such an expectation for a negative sentence to be felicitous. The story
provided for (2) had made it clear that the troll was supposed to deliver all the pizzas, therefore making
the interpretation in (2-b) felicitous. In Musolino’s experiment, however, the context story for (1) did not
introduce an expectation that all three horses would jump over the fence, making (1-b) less felicitous.
To summarize, on Gualmini’s pragmatic account, children and adults do not differ in their grammatical
abilities, but rather in how they react to an infelicitous sentence: adults are able to overcome the infelic-
ity, and accept the sentence (on its true reading); children, on the other hand, are unable to accommodate
the infelicitous sentence and therefore tend to reject it.
2.1.2. The Question Answer Requirement approach
The claim that the difference between children and adults in scope ambiguity resolution can be
explained in terms of a pragmatic difference was subsequently refined and extended beyond the case
of negative sentences. In particular, Gualmini et al. (2008), building on work by Roberts (1996) and
others, proposed that the relevant factor in scope ambiguity resolution is the understood Question Under
Discussion (QUD). The idea is that any declarative sentence is understood as an answer to a particular
QUD. And, as a consequence, each reading of a scopally ambiguous sentence also has to be understood
as an answer to the salient QUD at that moment. Gualmini et al. (2008) call this pragmatic condition
the Question and Answer Requirement (QAR). To illustrate, let us go back to the sentence in (1) and
imagine that the context made relevant the question in (3). In this case, it is clear that both (1-a) and
(1-b) would constitute good answers to the question, with both leading to a no-answer to (3). Therefore,
according to the QAR approach, either reading could be selected.
(3) Did every horse jump over the fence?
On the other hand, if the context made salient the question in (4), only the surface scope interpretation
in (1-a) would constitute a good answer. The inverse scope interpretation in (1-b) would not allow us to
conclude a negative or positive answer to (4). Therefore, if the understood QUD for (1) is (4), according
to the QAR, (1) can only be interpreted on its surface scope reading.
(4) Did any horse jump over the fence?
Of course, the influence of the QUD on the interpretation of sentences like (1) by itself does not allow
us to explain the difference between children and adults. The additional ingredient that Gualmini et
al. invoke is the following. While the QAR is always in place for both children and adults, the two groups
differ in their pragmatic ability to manage QUDs. That is, in an attempt to access true interpretations
in the context (sometimes referred to as adhering to a Principle of Charity, (see Grice 1975, among
others), adults can sometimes set aside the relevant QUD made salient by the context, and accommodate
a new one that can be answered by the true interpretation of the ambiguous sentence. Children, on the
other hand, are unable to accommodate a different QUD, and therefore have to select the interpretation
that provides a good answer to the salient QUD, whether that interpretation is made true or false in the
given context. This difference would also underlie the divergence between children and adults reported
in studies like Musolino (1998), as well as potentially accounting for the variation across experimental
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contexts, as shown by Gualmini (2004) and others.
It is important to note that on this approach, surface and inverse scope interpretations are not as-
signed different statuses. That is, setting aside the influence of the salient QUD in the context, children
should in principle be able to access both surface and inverse scope readings of an ambiguous sentence.
An alternative account of the data above put forward by Musolino & Lidz (2006) instead maintains that
there is a substantive difference between surface and inverse scope for the child, with the initial default
reading being the surface scope interpretation.
To distinguish between these two hypotheses, Gualmini et al. (2008) investigated sentences like
(5-a) and (5-b), both presented in the context of the troll story described above, where the troll was
supposed to deliver four pizzas, but only managed to deliver two. The implicit QUD arising from such a
story context would be something like (6).
(5) a. Some pizzas were not delivered.
b. Some pizzas were not lost.
(6) Were all pizzas delivered?
While both (5-a) and (5-b) are made true on their surface scope interpretations, only (5-a) is a good
answer to the QUD in (6). (5-b) is not informative on its surface scope interpretation. The only way
(5-b) can address the assumed QUD is if it is interpreted on its inverse scope reading (i.e. it’s not true
that some pizzas were lost = No pizzas were lost), in which case it would constitute a possible – albeit
false – answer.
(5-a) and (5-b) provide a test of the QAR approach as compared to an approach that incorporates
some preference for surface scope interpretations, in the following way: if children are driven by the
QUD in their resolution of scope ambiguity, as predicted by the QAR, they should select the inverse
scope interpretation of (5-b) and therefore reject the sentence as false. If children have a bias or pref-
erence for surface scope interpretations (Musolino & Lidz, 2006), they should select the surface scope
interpretation, which makes the sentence true. Gualmini et al. found that in 55% of cases, children re-
jected (5-b), accessing the only reading that was a good answer to the QUD. Based on these results,
Gualmini et al. claim that the observed difference between children’s and adults’ scope ambiguity reso-
lution is entirely due to their pragmatic abilities, and in particular, to the fact that the two groups manage
the QUD differently.
2.2. Scopally ambiguous questions
Summarizing, the QAR approach places the difference between children’s and adults’ interpre-
tations of scopally ambiguous sentences entirely in the management of the QUD. A prediction of this
approach is therefore that if QUD effects are controlled for, we should observe no difference between the
two groups. In the present study, as a way of controlling for QUD, we investigated children’s and adults’
interpretations of scopally ambiguous questions, rather than scopally ambiguous declarative sentences.
The idea is that in this linguistic context, the different readings of the questions no longer constitute
answers to the salient QUD, and we should therefore observe no difference between children and adults.
A natural step would be to examine the same sentences that have been used in previous studies
of children’s scope ambiguity resolution, but in interrogative rather than declarative form. Given most
previous studies used sentences involving negation, this would mean investigating participants’ interpre-
tations of negative questions. Interpreting such negative questions, however, would present a variety of
complications. For instance, it is well known that negative questions are subject to a bias that may in-
fluence the answer they receive (Romero & Han, 2004), and moreover that the mapping between yes/no
answers and questions containing negation is also not straightforward (Krifka 2001 among others). For
these reasons, we investigated questions containing two quantifiers, such as (7).
(7) Did a doctor take each pencil?
a. Is it true that there is a single doctor that took each pencil? Surface scope reading
b. Is it true that for each pencil there is a doctor who took it? Inverse scope reading
(7) has two possible interpretations: a surface scope reading, in which what is being questioned is
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whether there is one single doctor who took each of the pencils; and an inverse scope reading, in which
the question is about whether each of the pencils was taken by a (possibly different) doctor. While re-
search on children’s scope ambiguity resolution has mostly focused on sentences containing negation
and a quantifier, the declarative version of (7) and similar sentences, e.g., (8), have received consider-
able attention in research on adults (Johnson-Laird 1969; Gillen 1991; Kurtzman & MacDonald 1993;
Tunstall 1998; Anderson 2004 among others).1
(8) A doctor took each pencil.
a. There is a single doctor that took each pencil.
b. For each pencil there is a doctor who took it.
3. Experiment
Children and adults were tested on their interpretation of questions like (7), repeated below, which
were posed at the end of a short story context that would elicit a yes-response if the question was inter-
preted on its inverse scope reading, and a no-response if the question was interpreted on its surface scope
reading.2
(9) Did a doctor take each pencil?
a. Is it true that there is a single doctor that took each pencil? Surface scope reading
b. Is it true that for each pencil there is a doctor who took it? Inverse scope reading
3.1. Methodology
3.1.1. Participants
We tested 27 undergraduate students at Ulster University and 18 children (4; 03−6; 09,M = 5; 05).
All participants were native speakers of English. The data from three children were excluded from the
analysis, as these children scored below 75% accuracy on control and filler items.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were presented with an animated PowerPoint presentation on a laptop computer, depict-
ing the content of the various stories, while an experimenter read the stories aloud to the participant. At
the end of each story, participants would see a short video clip embedded in the PowerPoint presentation,
1 In particular, numerous experimental studies have shown that the universal quantifier is generally unlikely to take
scope over the existential. The majority of these studies, however, have paired the existential quantifier with the
universal every. Various explanations have been proposed for this preference for surface scope. Initial proposals
(Ioup, 1975) claimed the lexical properties of each quantifier influenced its likeliness to take wide scope, with every
ranking lower than a in likeliness. Later, researchers focused on the possibility that computing the inverse scope of
(7) increases the processing load for the sentence, possibly because the surface scope interpretation is considered
first, and then revised, coherent with the Garden Path model (Frazier & Fodor 1978, among others). This latter
hypothesis appears to be supported by self-paced reading studies (Tunstall, 1998; Anderson, 2004), which have
shown that (7) and similar sentences are read significantly slower when interpreted on their inverse scope readings,
an effect that is not mitigated by the presence of a supportive context. For this reason, we chose to examine each
rather than every, as it is generally recognised as being more prone to take wide scope (Ioup, 1975; VanLehn, 1978;
Fodor, 1982).
2 We chose to test the a–every surface configuration rather than every–a, since on the every–a surface order (as
in (i) below), it would not be possible to make the inverse scope reading (i-b) true while making the surface scope
reading (i-a) false. Unlike the case in (9), given the entailment relation between the two readings in (i-a) and (i-b),
we would not be able to find evidence for the inverse scope reading from participants’ responses. See Footnote 4 for
a notion of entailment in questions.
(i) Did every doctor take a pencil?
a. Is it true that, for each doctor, there is a pencil that s/he took? Surface scope reading
b. Is it true that there is some pencil such that every doctor took it? Inverse scope reading
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showing a puppet asking the relevant question. The puppet was voiced by a native speaker of English,
who had been instructed to record the questions with a neutral intonation.
At the beginning of the session, participants received a brief explanation of the task and they were
asked whether they had any questions. The task began with four training items that were designed to
familiarize participants with the task. Feedback was provided on these trials. Two of the training items
were associated with yes-targets, and two with no-targets. Training items involved simple non-quantified
questions, as in (10).
(10) Context story: The bear and the dog are having a picnic. They want to eat the muffin, but there
is only one. In the end, the dog decides to eat a cookie, so the bear eats the muffin.
Target question: Did the bear eat the muffin?
The main trials immediately followed the training items: each participant received four target trials, four
controls, and four fillers, presented in one of two possible pseudo-randomized orders.
Target stories all followed the same basic structure. As inverse scope is generally hard to obtain
for sentences containing an existential and a universal quantifier, the stories were designed to overcome
this difficulty, making inverse scope as natural and easy to obtain as possible. For example, the story
immediately introduced multiple characters, as having multiple entities already present in the mind of
the speaker could make it easier to later refer the existential quantifier of the ambiguous sentence to
more than one entity (Altmann & Steedman, 1988). Additionally, stories always featured two groups of
characters, of which one engaged with the set of objects and the other did not, to contrastively focus the
first. There is some evidence that having a second set of characters plays a role in making the inverse
scope reading of sentences like (9) more acceptable (Kim, 2013). An example of a test story with its
associated test question is provided in (11). In this story, the outcome is that the three doctors each take
a different pencil. Participants should therefore give a yes-response only if they obtain the inverse scope
interpretation of the target question, and a no-response otherwise.
(11) Context story: The doctors and the nurses are looking for pencils to write with. They see some
pencils on a desk. There is a green pencil, a blue pencil and a red pencil. Both the doctors and
the nurses have a look at the pencils. The doctors get first choice, so they go to the desk first.
One doctor takes the green pencil, another doctor takes the blue pencil. The third doctor takes
the red pencil. The nurses don’t take any pencils.
Target question: Did a doctor take each pencil?
Figure 1: Example target item.
We also included four control items (two containing just the existential quantifier and two containing
just the universal quantifier, with a yes- and a no-target for each) to ascertain that our participants had
a general understanding of the relevant quantifiers in isolation, and moreover to make sure that our
participants were able to give both yes- and no-answers. Control items were similar to targets, with one
of the quantifiers replaced by a proper name; therefore the story featured either one agent performing an
action on a set of three patients (each controls, as in (12) and the accompanying Figure 2) or a set of
characters, one of which performed an action on a patient (a controls, as in (13) and the accompanying
Figure 3).3
3 Notice that in the controls for the indefinite, the quantifier is about a single individual, while in the target items
it is about more than one individual, on the inverse scope interpretation. There is some evidence in the previous
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(12) Each control (no-target)
Context story: Anna is a doctor. She is going to visit some patients: a boy, a man and an old
woman. Anna visits the boy and gives him some medicine. Then she visits the man and gives
him the medicine too. However she realises that there is no time to visit the last patient, the old
woman, so she doesn’t visit the old woman and she has to leave.
Target question: Did Anna visit each patient?
(13) A control (yes-target)
Context story: Lucy goes to a restaurant. She is waiting for someone to come and speak to her.
There are some waiters in the room. Finally, a waiter comes and greets Lucy.
Target question: Did a waiter greet Lucy?
Figure 2: Example of an each control item.
Figure 3: Example of an a control item.
In addition to the targets and controls, four fillers were used to balance the overall number of yes-
and no-responses. Like the training items, fillers did not contain any quantifiers. Each of the filler stories
could be associated with one of two different questions, one which would elicit a yes-response and one
which would elicit a no-response (see (14) for an example). The experimenter selected the appropriate
target based on the participant’s response to the immediately preceding target item.
(14) Context story: The zebra and the lion are walking through a garden, looking for their friend,
the penguin, who is hiding. In the end, the zebra sees the penguin. The lion doesn’t see him
because he is behind the tree.
Yes-target: Did the zebra see the penguin?
No-target: Did the lion see the penguin?
literature that, at least for sentences containing negation and a quantifier, inverse scope can be primed by letting
the participant hear an unambiguous sentence containing the same elements. For example, participants who hear (i)
show a higher acceptance rate for the inverse scope reading of (ii) (Viau et al., 2010).
(i) Not every spider hid behind the fence
(ii) Every spider didn’t hide behind the fence
This phenomenon has recently been investigated for doubly quantified sentences as well (Kim, 2013), albeit with
less clear results. Nevertheless, to avoid any possible influence of a priming effect, the a-controls were always the
last items in both presentation orders.
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3.2. Results
Both groups performed well on control and filler items, scoring above 92% accuracy on these trials.
We found no difference between children and adults on controls and fillers (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
W=242, p>.05). Both groups were able to give both yes- and no-responses, and understood the meanings
of the relevant quantifiers.
Moving on to performance on targets, children’s and adults’ rate of yes-answers (corresponding to
inverse scope interpretations) is shown in Figure 4. A Mann-Whitney test revealed no significant differ-
ence between the two groups (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney W=177.5, p>.05). When giving no-responses,
participants from both groups generally justified their responses by referring to the fact that there was
no single individual who performed the relevant action (e.g., there was no single doctor who took all the
pencils).
Figure 4: Percentage of inverse scope responses on targets.
3.2.1. Discussion
The prediction that we set out to test in our experiment was the following. Building on the QAR
approach as formulated in Gualmini et al. (2008), children and adults should show no difference in
accessing inverse scope readings for scopally ambiguous questions. This is based on two assumptions.
First, children and adults only differ in how they handle and accommodate the QUD, and therefore they
should be able to access inverse scope equally well in a situation where there simply is no QUD. Second,
questions are not influenced by QUDs in the same way that declarative sentences are.
The prediction is confirmed by our results: we found no difference between children and adults
in their interpretation of the target scopally ambiguous questions. The results are also in line with the
view that children’s failure to access inverse scope in certain previous experiments is likely not due to a
deficiency in their grammars.
As we have previously mentioned, the QAR approach is meant to be a condition on declarative
sentences, and one could formulate it as in (15). Formulated in this way, the QAR is silent about how
scopally ambiguous questions should be interpreted.
(15) QAR: The available interpretations of a scopally ambiguous sentence are those that entail an
answer to the salient Question Under Discussion.
Our results are compatible with two hypotheses concerning the QAR and the interpretation of questions
more generally. First, QUDs may only be relevant for the interpretation of scopally ambiguous declara-
tive sentences; the interpretation of scopally ambiguous questions is driven by other factors. Under this
hypothesis, the QAR can be maintained as it is. A second hypothesis is instead that QUDs also have an
effect on the interpretation of questions, and we should seek to extend the QAR approach to incorporate
this. In the following, we outline this second hypothesis in more detail, and sketch a follow-up that could
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help us to distinguish between the two hypotheses.
3.3. Extending the QAR to questions?
In the theoretical literature, QUDs are not considered to be elements in isolation. Rather the dis-
course is conceived of as being organized as a set of QUDs that are ordered by entailment relations
(Roberts, 1996; Bu¨ring, 2003; Aloni et al., 2007).4 More generally, the idea is that the discourse is
organized as a game in which the ultimate goal for the interlocutors is to answer the main question –
What’s the way things are? (Roberts, 1996). Such a question is too broad to be answered at once, and
for this reason it is broken down into smaller subquestions, which are easier for participants to manage.
Answering a subquestion also provides a partial answer to its broader super questions, and in a similar
way, answering a superquestion also answers anything below it. The immediate QUD in a given context
is related to other broader questions that entail it. An example can be seen in (16).
(16) Who ate what?
a. What did Hilary eat?
(i) Did Hilary eat bagels?
(ii) Did Hilary eat tofu?
Given this set up, we could assume that a mechanism similar to the one that holds for declarative sen-
tences is also at play here. That is, the available interpretations of ambiguous questions could only those
that are entailed by the superquestion made relevant by the context. The QAR could then be extended to
incorporate questions, as follows:
(17) Extended QAR
a. The available interpretations of a scopally ambiguous sentence are those that entail an
answer to the salient Question Under Discussion.
b. The available interpretations of a scopally ambiguous question are those that are entailed
by their (immediate) superquestion.
This would mean that the interpretation of scopally ambiguous questions, like that of scopally ambiguous
declaratives, is also driven by questions salient in the context. And this opens the door to potential
differences between children and adults in the interpretation of scopally ambiguous questions.
How might this hypothesis be compatible with our results, given that we found no difference be-
tween the two groups? We could assume that our experimental story contexts made relevant a superques-
tion that entails the inverse scope interpretation of the target question. If so, children and adults would
then be expected to have no problems accessing such an interpretation. For instance, in the doctor story
described above in (11), we could assume that, since we were interested in knowing whether all pencils
were taken by some doctor or another, the context generated the question (18), which is equivalent to,
and therefore entails, the inverse scope interpretation of (19) in (19-b).
(18) Is it true that for each pencil, there was a doctor who took it?
(19) Did a doctor take each pencil?
a. Is it true that there is a single doctor that took each pencil?
b. Is it true that for each pencil, there was a doctor who took it?
In sum, the results of the experiment described above are compatible with an extension of the QAR
to questions, and with the idea that the interpretation of questions is also influenced by salient (su-
per)questions in the context. A follow-up directly manipulating the implicit superquestion in the context
would allow us test this hypothesis. The idea would be to use two different contexts (20) associated
with the same ambiguous question, such as the one in (21), with one of the contexts making relevant
4 Entailment between questions can be defined as follows (Roberts 1996, among others):
(i) A question q1 entails a question q2 if and only if every proposition p that answers q1 also answers q2.
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a surface scope-biasing superquestion, (20-a), and the other making relevant an inverse scope-biasing
superquestion, (20-b).
(20) a. Surface scope-biasing context: The leader of the afterschool club hopes to find a boy
who practices all sports: if there is a single boy who enters the football tournament, the
basketball tournament, and the rugby tournament, he will give him a medal.
b. Inverse scope-biasing context: The leader of the afterschool club hopes to run three tourna-
ments: a football tournament, a basketball tournament, and a rugby tournament. He needs
one more person to complete the teams, so he hopes that someone will join each one of the
tournaments.
(21) Target question: Did a boy enter each tournament?
Figure 5: The boys enter the sport tournaments
Here, the surface scope-biasing context (20-a) explicitly mentions that we are interested in finding
out whether there is a single individual who joined all tournaments, thereby making salient the question
Is there a single individual who entered each tournament? In contrast, the inverse scope context (20-b)
(accompanying Figure 5), similar to the contexts used in the present study, puts the emphasis on whether
some boy or other joined all the tournaments. It therefore makes salient the question Is it true that
for each tournament there is a boy who entered it? If our intuitions are correct, (21) should lead to a
yes-answer more frequently when presented in context (20-b). We are currently collecting data on this
follow-up.
4. Conclusions
In the study reported in this paper we investigated the interpretation of scopally ambiguous questions
by 4–6-year-old children and adults. Our main finding was that both children and adults had no problems
accessing inverse scope interpretations of such questions. The results are in line with recent pragmatic
approaches to the acquisition of scope ambiguity, which assume that children have the capacity to gen-
erate both surface and inverse scope interpretations of ambiguous sentences, sometimes differing from
adults due to pragmatic factors, in particular due to their management of the understood Question Under
Discussion (Gualmini et al., 2008). Considering more broadly the implications for QUD approaches and
for the interpretation of questions, we have seen that the present results are compatible with two possible
scenarios: either the QUD is not relevant for the interpretation for questions, or the QAR approach can
be extended to questions, and our contexts made salient a super-question that facilitated inverse scope
interpretations. Future work may aim to distinguish these two scenarios experimentally.
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